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ABSTRACT
According to the Great-Man Theory, the creation of something new used to be accred-
ited solely to one outstanding individual: the champion. This prevailing notion in Anglo-
American research was first challenged by Witte (1973), who concluded that an inno-
vation cannot be a one-man decision, since the creation of something new usually 
involves highly complex and multi-person decision processes. Witte’s model credits the 
success not to one all-around individual, but to the cooperation of several different spe-
cialized persons (so called promotors). Even though the Great-Man Theory is still lead-
ing the discussion, the idea of specialized promotors should not be underestimated. In 
this article we discuss the circumstances under which specialized promotors or gener-
alized champions are better suited for economic progress. We find extensive empirical 
proof for both roles. 
JEL-Classification:  M12, O32.
Keywords:  Champions; Promotors.
  
1 INTRODUCTION
In the 1970’s, Eberhard Witte developed the idea of promotors. He deﬁ ned promotors as 
“individuals who actively and intensively support the innovation process” (Witte (1973, 
15-16)). Witte started by asking how economic progress develops. Technological inven-
tions, i.e., new products, production materials, or production processes, might or might 
not generate economic value (Walter (1998, 37)). Based on the question of how economic 
progress develops, Witte identiﬁ ed barriers against innovation that hinder economic prog-
ress. Th ese barriers can severely handicap or even prevent innovation altogether if they are 
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not overcome by the organization. Witte assumed that since these barriers are created by 
people who either do not want the innovation or are not capable of implementing it, then 
only people can overcome these barriers. Witte’s concept assigns the success of an inno-
vation not only to one all-around “star”, but also to the cooperation of several diﬀ erent 
kinds of specialized promotors (Hauschildt (2004, 197)).
Admittedly Witte’s concept of specialized promotors conﬂ icts with the Great-Man Th eory 
of generalized champions. In this tradition, the success of an innovation used to be accred-
ited solely to one outstanding individual, who was called champion (Hauschildt (2004, 
195)). Witte challenged this general belief of a single person’s actions. He argued that 
innovation processes involve very complex and multi-person decision processes that 
cannot be borne by only one individual. However, so far, the promoter concept has not 
been too successful in Anglo-American research, as the Great-Man Th eory is still leading 
the discussion (Research on champions, e.g., Schon (1963); Chakrabarti (1974); Achill-
adelis et al. (1971); Burgelman (1983); Roberts and Fusfeld (1988); Frost and Egri (1991); 
Day (1994); Dougherty and Hardy (1996); Howell and Higgins (1990); Howell et al. 
(2005), Lam (2005)). Since there is extensive empirical proof for both promotors as well 
as champions, we discuss the circumstances under which specialized promotors or gener-
alized champions are more suited for economic progress (Research on promotors, e.g., 
Witte (1973); Gemünden (1985); Gierschner (1991); Gemünden and Walter (1996); 
Hauschildt and Kirchmann (1997); Klöter (1997); Walter (1998); Folkerts (2001); Folk-
erts and Hauschildt (2002), Gemünden and Hölzle (2005)). 
2 THE MODEL OF SPECIALIZED PROMOTORS
2.1 WIT TE’S TWO-CENTER THEORY OF POWER AND KNOW-HOW 
Innovations are changes signifying that old “traditions” are disappearing and “something 
new” has to be accepted. If these changes “… developed automatically and more or less 
on its own, without encountering any personnel or technical barriers, no speciﬁ c organi-
zational structure encouraging innovation would be required. But we cannot simply take 
it for granted that, once the problems of decision-making are mastered intellectually, the 
rational solution will be immediately understood and implemented by the competent 
authorities. Indeed, empirical studies have shown that innovation decision-making prob-
lems can be solved only by complex, multi-personnel and multi-operational decision-
making processes. ….” (Witte (1973, 48-49)). Because innovations cause decision-making 
problems, they often lead to the resistance by employees. Th ese problems arise from the 
uncertainty of the new situation and are expressed as the wish to maintain the status quo 
(Witte (1973, 7); March and Simon (1958)). “…Th e new is quite usually synonymous 
with the unreasonable, the dangerous, the impossible…” (Kallen (1973, 450)). Barriers 
delay or even prevent the implementation of new ideas (Witte (1973, 6)). Employees 
express their resistance against innovations by their attitude or motivation towards the 
“new.”1 Most employees have no reason to support the innovation, as the previous behavior 
1 Witte (1973, 5ff.) calls these motivational barriers to willingness, i.e., not willing.
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patterns were successful and they cannot predict what the new situation will be like, or 
what advantages and disadvantages will be connected to it (Hauschildt (2004, 175)). Th e 
“new” can also lead to cognitive resistance2: many employees seem incapable of giving up 
previous knowledge and painfully acquired experiences, particularly since the objectives 
concerning the innovation are too fuzzy (Hauschildt (2004, 175)). Th us, the progress of 
innovation depends on the employees’ willingness and ability to cooperate. 
Barriers, i.e., rejection, ignorance, or opposition, appear in the form of people who either 
do not want the innovation or are not capable of implementing it. Consequently, to 
surmount these barriers, organizations need persons who can start the innovation process 
and keep it going on until a ﬁ nal decision is reached. Witte called these people promo-
tors. Promotors are those individuals who actively and enthusiastically promote innova-
tions throughout the crucial organizational stages.
Because the problem-solving capacities of every human are limited, diﬀ erent actors have 
diﬀ erent previous knowledge (Bandura (1976); Rumelhart (1980); Dosi, Nelson, and 
Winter (2000)). Actors can only consider those goals and alternatives for a problem’s 
solution that correspond to their previous knowledge (March and Simon (1958)). It 
seems plausible that the kind of previous knowledge an individual has inﬂ uences the 
problem-solving capacity of that person and their recognition of barriers during these 
search eﬀ orts. Th erefore, Witte postulates that activities to overcome barriers in the inno-
vation process are contributed by diﬀ erent specialized persons, i.e., from employees with 
diﬀ erent previous knowledge. Witte diﬀ erentiates between two kinds of specialization, the 
“power promoter” and the “expert promoter” and bases this distinction on the following 
assumptions. 
(1) Correspondence between barriers and contributions. In each organization there is a 
correspondence between the resistance of some employees and the resistance-overcoming 
contributions of other employees. Th e motivational resistance of some employees is recog-
nized and overcome by the hierarchical potential of other employees. Th e cognitive resist-
ance of some employees is recognized and overcome by the expert knowledge of other 
employees.
(2.) Role specialization of the contributor. Th e contributions to overcoming the resist-
ance of some employees are made by specialized persons. Th e “power promoter” contrib-
utes through hierarchical power and the “expert promoter” contributes through expert 
knowledge.
(3.) Promoter cooperation. Th e innovation process will be successful if both specialized 
promotors work closely together (Hauschildt and Kirchmann (1997, 68)).
Because changes need the cooperativeness of employees, “power promoters” actively foster 
the innovation process by means of hierarchical power. (Witte (1973, 17)). Th e deﬁ ning 
characteristics of the power promoter are a certain position within the organizational 
2 Cognitive barriers are called ability barriers or barriers of not knowing. See Witte (1973, 5ff.).
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structure and a certain type of behavior. Power promotors recognize barriers, sanction 
antagonists, and support and protect innovation-enthusiastic employees based on their 
hierarchical position (Shepard (1967, 471)). 
“Expert Promotors” actively encourage the innovation process by means of speciﬁ c knowl-
edge (Witte (1973, 18)). Usually, this promoter has a line function in a department 
that closely connected with the innovation. Th e expert promoter may become aware of 
the potential innovation by recognizing weaknesses within the daily work routine. Th ese 
promotors also help to overcome employees’ cognitive barriers by recognizing problems. 
To do so, they use their extraordinary speciﬁ c expert knowledge, since many employees 
lack the cognitive prerequisites to ﬁ nd speciﬁ c problem solutions or to engage in multi-
disciplinary interactions with others (Walter (1998, 60)). Expert promotors also assist 
other employees to understand new problems and use their expert knowledge as argument 
against antagonists. For this reason, a solitary scientist is not an expert promoter, because 
such a person does not motivate others to work for an innovation.
Th ese two kinds of promotors must be understood as normative role types. Both explain 
social roles of actors, i.e., an abstract bundle of abilities, social behaviors, and motives for 
action (Fuchs-Heinritz et al. (1995); Wiswede (2004, 1289ﬀ .)). However, reality does not 
always correspond to these theoretical role concepts.
2.2 EXTENSION OF THE PROMOTER-CONCEPT
In the 1990s, Hauschildt and Chakrabarti discovered a third barrier that can hinder 
economic progress: administrative barriers (Hauschildt and Chakrabarti (1988, 378-388)). 
Th ese barriers emerge in those organizations that are predominantly run by routines, for 
example, by a risk-averse ﬁ nancial controlling philosophy (Hauschildt and Gemünden 
(1999, 93)). Moreover, cooperation barriers (Allen (1967); Allen et al. (1979)) and 
dependency barriers (Gemünden and Walter (1995)) prevent innovations. Coopera-
tion barriers result from signiﬁ cant mental, language, and intercultural distance between 
employees. Dependency barriers are caused by a disequilibrium in relationships. Some-
times, and especially in changing situations, the asymmetric power of relationships may 
be used to dictate activities to the other party or to prevent activities. 
Because Witte assumed that there does exist a correspondence between the resistance 
of some employees and the resistance-overcoming contributions of other employees, 
other studies specify additional contributions. Administrative barriers can be recognized 
and overcome by organizational knowledge, cooperation barriers by socialization, and 
dependency barriers by network competence (Gemünden and Ritter (2003)). Based on 
Witte’s assumption of role specialization, these contributions are made by specialized 
persons. “Process promotors” possess organizational knowledge, technological gatekeepers3 
3 The technological gatekeeper – one of the oldest roles of innovation management – is often not represented by 
the promoter concept. We add the technological gatekeeper as fifth specialized role, since these specific contri-
butions are not expressed in the promoter concept.
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contribute to the socialization of teams, and “relationship promotors” add their network 
competence to innovation processes. 
“Process promotors” actively arbitrate between the technical and economic world by means 
of organizational knowledge (Hauschildt (2004, 213f.); Hauschildt and Chakrabarti 
(1988, 385f.)). Since innovations not only aﬀ ect the innovating department but also inﬂ u-
ence other departments in the organization, economic progress needs both the good will 
of the immediate participants and also the good will of the aﬀ ected actors. Process promo-
tors overcome administrative barriers by recognizing organizational hurdles (Hauschildt 
and Chakrabarti (1988, 378ﬀ .); Hauschildt and Kirchmann (1997, 69); Hauschildt and 
Schewe (1997, 509)). Th e deﬁ ning characteristics of the process promoter is his or her role 
in interfacing within the organizational structure, e.g., as project leader. Based on their 
negotiation skills, the process promoter mediates between involved and aﬀ ected parties 
(Hauschildt (2004, 213)).
Technological Gatekeepers actively support cross-organizational knowledge transfer (Allen 
(1967, 35; 1977, 141ﬀ .)). Th e deﬁ ning characteristics of the gatekeepers are their tech-
nological competence and their cross-organizational relationships with other scientists. 
Innovations often derive from the combination of external information with internal 
knowledge. However, external information is often unconsciously ignored, suppressed, 
forgotten, distorted, or seen and commented on in a prejudiced way (Nisbett and Ross 
(1980); Janis (1972); Mehrwald (1999)). Gatekeepers overcome these barriers by recog-
nizing relevant information and communicating this information to their colleagues: ... 
gatekeepers are among the organization′s highest technical performers...” (See Allen (1977; 
171)). Gatekeepers often start socialization processes in work groups, i.e., they help to 
overcome signiﬁ cant mental, language, and intercultural distances between members of 
diﬀ erent organisations (Katz and Tushman (1981)).
“Relationship promotors” actively encourage an innovation process by means of innovation-
related business relationships inside and between the organization and its external part-
ners (Gemünden and Walter (1995, 971, 974). Th e deﬁ ning characteristic of relationship 
promotors is their extensive network competence, i.e., powerful relationships with other 
parties. Sometimes employees do not want to share knowledge, for example, because they 
dislike or envy one another. Relationship promotors overcome dependency barriers by 
recognizing knowledge transfer barriers and initiate, design, and foster relationships to 
important actors and third parties (Gemünden and Walter (1996, 273ﬀ .). 
3 GREAT-MAN THEORY OF THE CHAMPION 
Contrary to the promoter-concept, champion research is looking for generalists who play 
multiple roles (Schon (1963); Achilladelis et al. (1971); Chakrabarti (1974); Rothwell 
et al. (1974); Burgelman (1983); Howell and Higgins (1990); Frost and Egri (1991); 
Day (1994); Dougherty and Hardy (1996)). Champions are “individuals who informally 
emerge to actively and enthusiastically promote innovations through the crucial organiza-
tional stages” (Howell et al. (2005, 642)). Champion research often refers to this general 
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deﬁ nition without deﬁ ning precise role attributes of the champion: “Most of what has 
been reported about champions is largely anecdotal, reﬂ ecting the researcher’s impressions, 
rather than reliable and valid measurement using well accepted instruments” (Howell et al. 
(2005, 644)). Schon describes champions based on the attributes of informal selling, inno-
vative ideas, informal power, reliability, and heroic qualities (Schon (1963)). Burgelman 
adds that champions mobilize forgotten ideas and launch these ideas by communicating 
with the top management (Burgelmann (1983)). Moreover, champions act in concert with 
other stakeholders for a common achievement of objectives (Galbraith (1982); Markham 
and Griﬃ  n (1998); Shane (1994)). Howell et al. attempt to close the research gap in the 
champion literature by specifying precise behaviours of the champion role. Unfortunately, 
the results are imprecise, just as we would expect for an all-round champion role concept. 
Th e authors conclude that champions belong to middle management, and possess enthu-
siasm, persistence, and network competence (Howell et al. (2005)).
Ultimately, the champion role, i.e., the universal promoter, corresponds with Witte’s 
personal union. Witte mentions in his research that promoter roles can be combined in 
one role. Th e personal union of the power and expert promotors refers to a person who 
actively promotes an innovation process by using both hierarchic potential and object-
speciﬁ c know-how. In Witte’s sense, the concentration of promoter roles is inferior to the 
team of independent promotors, because a one-man decision cannot oﬀ set a two-man 
decision (Witte (1973, 21)). Furthermore, Hauschildt and Kirchmann also supports the 
notion of specialized promotors as being the most eﬃ  cient for complex processes like 
innovations (Hauschildt and Kirchmann (1997, 71)).
4 PROMOTORS OR CHAMPIONS?
In a sense, not only specialized promotors are suited for economic progress, as but the 
Anglo-American literature still favors and empirically conﬁ rms the champion. In fact, this 
contradiction in innovation research makes sense as promotors or champions are hardly 
observable. Th ese work roles informally emerge to actively and enthusiastically promote 
innovations, but are not a part of the employment agreement. Research in organizations 
often ﬁ nds empirical conﬁ rmation for promotors and champions. Th erefore, both kinds 
of individuals must be an integral part of innovation processes. It also does not seem 
feasible that cultural diﬀ erences lead to the description of an all-rounder in the Anglo-
American area and to the specialist in the German area. We believe that both types appear. 
However, it remains unclear under which circumstances champions or specialists foster 
economic progress.
Research shows that the cognitive abilities of each person are limited (Ellis (1965); Estes 
(1970); Pirolli and Anderson (1985)). Consequently, innovation experts have only two 
possibilities for using their abilities: specialization or generalization. Specialization implies 
that all cognitive abilities of a person are predominantly allocated to one ﬁ eld of knowl-
edge (component knowledge) (Henderson (1996, 370)), but at the same time, this allo-
cation limits the cognitive abilities in other related areas of knowledge (architectural 
knowledge) (Henderson (1996, 370)). As we noted earlier, specialization corresponds 
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with the promoter concept, which postulates that activities in the innovation process are 
contributed from diﬀ erent specialized persons. Generalization implies a more balanced 
distribution of the sum of all cognitive abilities of a person in multiple ﬁ elds of knowl-
edge (architectural knowledge), but synchronous implies less-deep knowledge in one ﬁ eld 
(component knowledge). Generalization is the equivalent of the concentration of work 
roles in the champion concept, that is, the all-embracing previous knowledge of one 
employee in diﬀ erent areas.
Th e distinction between component and architectural knowledge, or between the special-
ization and generalization of the cognitive abilities of a person, underscores the idea 
that successful innovation requires two types of knowledge. First, a successful innovator 
requires deep or basic knowledge about the product as a set of components. For example, 
a car’s major components include the motor, the control system, and the mechanical 
housing. Second, a successful innovator requires broad knowledge about the ways in 
which the components are linked together into a coherent whole. For example, the deci-
sion to use an electric motor instead of a gasoline engine establishes the product as a 
system (Henderson and Clark (1990)).
Th e advantages of both kinds of knowledge depend on the kind of economic progress 
that can be attained by reﬁ ning and improving an existing design or by introducing 
a new concept that diﬀ ers in a signiﬁ cant way from past practice (Mansﬁ eld (1968)). 
Incremental innovation introduces relatively minor changes to the existing product and 
exploits the potential of the established system of components (Nelson and Winter (1982); 
Tushman and Anderson (1986)). Although incremental innovation does not draw from a 
dramatically new science, it often calls for considerable new skills because employees must 
build on previous knowledge. Over time, incremental innovations might have signiﬁ cant 
economic consequences (Hollander, 1965). In contrast, radical innovation often intro-
duces major changes and explores the potential of a new system of components. Radical 
innovation is based on a diﬀ erent set of engineering, scientiﬁ c, and economic principles. 
It often calls for broad knowledge in multiple ﬁ elds and opens up new applications, new 
markets, or even redeﬁ nes an industry (Tushman and Anderson (1986), Henderson and 
Clark (1990)).
Radical innovation creates unmistakable challenges, since it often destroys the useful-
ness of established knowledge. For example, once the dominant automobile design had 
been accepted, engineers did not re-evaluate the decision to use a gasoline engine in every 
subsequent design, because incremental innovation only reﬁ nes and elaborates on the 
initial set of components. Th e emergence of a radical new technology is usually a period 
of considerable confusion. Recognizing what is useful and what is not, and acquiring and 
applying new knowledge when necessary, may be diﬃ  cult. Th ere is little agreement about 
what the major components of the product should be or how they should be put together 
(Clark (1985)). Th erefore, radical changes lead to even stronger decision-making problems 
between the diverse parties and increase the barriers against innovations.
For radical changes, research recommends an overlap of the problem solving capabili-
ties of persons who act jointly, i.e., architectural knowledge (Langlois (1992); Spender 
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(1993); Nooteboom (2000)). Architectural or general knowledge implies that employees 
not only have deep knowledge in one ﬁ eld, but are also well educated in other areas. For 
this reason, they are better able to see problem solutions from diﬀ erent viewpoints and to 
agree about what the major components of the new product should be or how they should 
be put together. For example, industrial engineers have engineering and business skills and 
are able to see problem solutions from the viewpoint of both an engineer and a manager. 
Th e champion also has a high amount of architectural or general knowledge. Th erefore, 
generalized champions should be better positioned to reduce the barriers against radical 
innovation, i.e., to reduce the decision-making problems between the diverse parties. Th e 
ﬁ ndings of Folkerts and Hauschildt support this assumption. Th e authors observed that 
champions are the most useful to promote radical innovation (Folkerts and Hauschildt 
(2002, 11)). Th e idea that all-rounders are better suited for radical innovation is also 
supported by the concepts of the “t-shaped employee” (Leonard-Barton (1998); Carlile 
(2004)) and of the interpersonal diversity (Bunderson and Sutcliﬀ e (2002)). In the case 
of radical innovation, the cited research shows that both concepts foster economic prog-
ress. Th e assumption that all-rounders are better suited for radical innovation could also 
explain why Anglo-American studies only consider the champion. Most research deals 
with radical rather than incremental technological change.
Since success in the market not only builds on the synthesis of unfamiliar technologies for 
creative new designs, organizations must actively develop knowledge about new ways in 
which components could be linked together and basic knowledge about the product as a 
set of components. For example, electric-powered cars as a technology of choice encourage 
organizations to learn more about electric-ﬁ red engines. Th erefore, successful organiza-
tions adjust their attention between learning a great deal about a new design and learning 
a little bit more about the old design. In the case of incremental change, employees must 
build on their earlier knowledge, since incremental innovation creates a scarce source of 
existing, mostly slightly changed knowledge.
As employees build on existing knowledge, incremental changes lead to fewer decision-
making problems between the diverse parties. Many employees have comparable skills 
from existing knowledge, e.g., from education or former experiences (Polanyi (1985)). 
Moreover, existing knowledge can be better phrased and reproduced. Existing knowledge 
also helps to build common understanding between employees with diﬀ erent educational 
backgrounds and skills. However, if knowledge has been accepted, it looses its competi-
tive advantages. Knowledge about the product as a set of components is more likely to 
be managed explicitly and can easily be imitated (Barney (1991)). Organizations that are 
actively engaged in incremental innovation thus only achieve comparative advantages if 
they are specialized, i.e. if they make use of the division of labour (Chandler (1990, 593); 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992); Foss and Iversen (1997); Kräkel (2002); Frese (2002)).
Specialization and the division of labor are in line with the promoter concept. In advanced 
technologies specialized employees with deep basic knowledge, i.e., component knowl-
edge, recognize opportunities better than do generalized employees with broad marginal 
knowledge, i.e., architectural knowledge, which explains why champions are less suited 
to reducing the barriers against incremental innovation. Th ey cannot see problem solu-
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tions by reﬁ ning and improving an existing design, and therefore are not able to agree on 
what the minor changes to the existing product should be or how the established system 
of components should be exploits.
In summary, the contributions of promotors and champions to surmounting barriers 
depend on the kind of economic progress within an industry or an area. If economic prog-
ress builds on previous knowledge and organizations only need to reﬁ ne and improve an 
existing design, the specialized promotors are more suitable. If economic progress cannot 
be built on previous knowledge and organizations must introduce a new concept that 
diﬀ ers in signiﬁ cant ways from past practice, then generalized champions are more suit-
able.
To test these assumptions, we measure how promotors or champions inﬂ uence the inno-
vation output of other employees.
Hypothesis:
Th e higher the previous knowledge of an organization in one technology area and the greater 
the extent of improvements of existing designs within this technology area, the better suited are 
specialized promotors to increase the innovation output of other employees
Th e less the previous knowledge of an organization in one technology area and the greater the 
extent of uncertainty within this technology area, the better suited are generalized champions 
to increase the innovation output of other employees.
5 METHOD
5.1 SAMPLE
We conducted a survey in the automotive industry. We chose the automotive industry 
because it is characterized by both incremental and radical technological changes (Tietze 
(2003). We explore only one industry, since the amount and quality of new knowledge 
is dependent on the sector (Michel and Bettels (2001); Harhoﬀ  and Reitzig (2001)). To 
acquire an adequate sample we used the population of all European (EP-) patents granted 
to German automotive companies from 1990-1999 and drew a random sample using 
the snowball procedure. Th e random sample consists of 1287 EP-patent families (in the 
following called EP-patents) of 533 inventors from 69 diﬀ erent companies. Using the 
technology classes of the patents, we looked at whether the selected sample mirrored the 
population of all patents. Th ere were no signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences4.
Next, we contacted the 533 inventors by mail and, if possible, by phone. We excluded 
147 inventors from the analysis because of movement, pension, or death. Overall, 386 
4 Michel and Bettels (2001); Harhoff, Scherer, and Vopel (2003) show that knowledge rate of returns in different 
industries are not comparable. The snowball procedure started with cooperation patents of big automotive man-
ufacturers. 
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persons were directly accessible. From this ﬁ nal sample 142 ﬁ lled-out questionnaires were 
returned, yielding a response rate of 36%. On the basis of diﬀ erent indicators, i.e., the 
technology classes, ﬁ rm aﬃ  liation, application date of a patent, number of EP patents per 
inventor, and the answer date, we examined whether the return rate mirrored the selected 
sample of the 533 inventors. We found that the diﬀ erences between participants and non-
participants were not signiﬁ cant, i.e., random5.
5.2 MEASUREMENTS 
Th e method of egocentric network analysis was used to identify promotors and cham-
pions. An egocentric network consists of the Alteri, i.e., the personal contacts of the 
interviewed person6. To select relevant Alteri from all contacts of a person, this method 
uses speciﬁ c questions, so-called name generators. One example of a name generator is 
the naming of all network partners with whom the interviewed person shares knowl-
edge. Th e respondent quotes his network partners via name codes, e.g., the network 
partner “Otto Baum” is speciﬁ ed by the name code “OB”. Later, we identify network 
partners who have been named by two respondents. In our study, the participants could 
indicate a maximum of eight network partners per each name generator. Overall, we 
used 15 diﬀ erent name generators. In total, we identiﬁ ed 1,905 job-related network 
partners of the 142 respondents.
Identiﬁ cation of work roles. We used ﬁ ve name generators to identify diﬀ erent network 
partners who were widely acknowledged in the organization as innovation experts and 
who were thought to actively and enthusiastically promote innovations through the 
crucial organizational stages (Walter (1998); Hauschildt and Gemünden (1999); Folk-
erts and Hauschildt (2002)). We asked for the work roles of the promoter concept, 
i.e., the power promoter, expert promoter, process promoter, and the relationship 
promoter, and the technological gatekeeper. An typical question we used to iden-
tify expert promoter was: “Please name those persons in your COMPANY, who -
after general understanding – actively encourage an innovation process by means of 
speciﬁ c knowledge. In particular, such persons who are proven technical and/or proce-
dure-speciﬁ c experts in innovation projects and who assist by the development of new 
5 We found an average age of 46 years and approximately 21 years of employment. We split these 21 years into 15 
years of employment in the actual company and 12 years in the current technology area. The work activity of 
the participants consisted to 26% of operative, application-oriented activities and to 17% of scientific activities 
(32%: discussions/meetings, 25%: administrative activities). On average, each participant held 18 patents, 12 
new product or process developments, and eight publications. Furthermore, each inventor was five times more 
involved in non-disclosure activities of his current company and received an average bonus per year of €1500.00 
for his inventions.
6 See Wasserman and Faust (1994). Egocentric networks represent the only network approach that permits the re-
searcher to pull a random sample and is therefore compatible with survey research. The free choice of persons – 
in contrast to the presentation of a list of names – further validates the measurements.
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products or procedure.” (see footnote 7 for all questions). To check whether our meas-
urements clearly identify informal work roles, we ran a pretest in a small organization. 
Th e external validity of the measurements was good, since we were able to clearly iden-
tify the same persons over multiple respondents as promotors or champions8.
In total, we identiﬁ ed 860 informal role owners in the networks of the 142 respondents. 
Th e number of role owners per work role are listed in table 1 (persons with multiple work 
roles are possible). Th e expert promoter occurs most frequently in networks and the power 
promoter occurs most rarely. Th ese results are in line with previous empirical ﬁ ndings 
(Folkerts and Hauschildt (2002)).
Table 1:  Descriptive statistic of informal role owners in ego networks*
Variable Min. max. mean std.dev.
Informal role types in ego networks
Expert promoter (KnwProAlteri) 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.41
Power promoter (PowProAlteri) 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.36
Process promoter (ProProAlteri) 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.37
Relationship Promoter (RelProAlteri) 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.36
Technological Gatekeeper (TecGaAlteri) 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.38
*N = 1,905 (multiple work-roles of persons are possible)
7 Please name those persons in your COMPANY, who – after general understanding – :
 (1) ... actively encourage an innovation process by means of specific knowledge. In particular, those persons who 
are proven technical and/or procedure-specific experts in innovation projects and who assist by the development 
of new products or procedure. (2) ... actively promote an innovation process by means of hierarchic power. In par-
ticular, those persons who order sanctions against opponents and provide protection for those who are in favor of 
innovation. (3) ... actively arbitrate between the technical and economic world by means of organizational knowl-
edge. In particular, those persons who recognize organizational hurdles and contribute to innovation processes 
through their negotiation capabilities. (4) ... actively encourage an innovation process by means of innovation-re-
lated business relationships inside and between the organization. In particular, those persons who initiate, design, 
and foster relationships to important actors and third parties. (5) ... actively support cross-organizational knowl-
edge transfer. In particular, those persons who assist and help by searching out and evaluating external technical 
information.
8 We selected one company that develops and tests new production technologies for automotive manufacturers. 
This company employs 111 employees in eight business units. We asked two employees and one departmental 
manager from each unit about their egocentric networks. We also talked to the CEOs. In total, we obtained 26 
non-anonymous data sets, which allowed an external validation of highly ranked actors in the company. This pre-
test confirmed with 60% accuracy a high reply consistency between the respondents. 
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Promotors compared to champions. We followed Witte by measuring promotors as the 
specialization of a person on only one work role. We measured champions as the concen-
tration of work roles in one person, i.e., the personal union. From the 860 named role 
owners, 445 persons are specialized on only one work role i.e., promotors, and 415 
persons are non-specialized champions. Th is result stands supports our assumption that 
both promotors and champions are an integral part of innovation processes.
Specialized promotors and generalized champions. We assume that promotors have a higher 
amount of component knowledge and that champions have a higher amount of architec-
tural knowledge. We empirically test these assumptions in table 2. Overall, the respondents 
regard champions as technical more similar to themselves as promotors. Th us, champions 
are more able to play a linking pin between diﬀ erent specialized employees. However, in 
comparison to champions, promotors are seen as more innovative within a nongeneric 
technical ﬁ eld. Th e innovativeness of a person within a nongeneric technical ﬁ eld needs 
specialist knowledge, which is an indication of a higher amount of component knowl-
edge. 
Table 2: Champion’s combination knowledge compared to promoter’s component  
 knowledge
Promoter/Champion Technical proximity to the respon-
dent as an indicator for architec-
tural knowledge
(1= low, 5 = high)
Outstanding innovativeness in a 
technical field as an indicator for 
component knowledge 
(1 = low, 5 = high)
Promoter (N = 445) 3.54 2.17
Champion with 2 roles (N = 168) 3.76 2.06
Champion with 3 roles (N = 85) 4.12 1.78
Champion with 4 roles (N = 73) 3.96 1.85
Champion with 5 roles (N = 42) 4.37 1.59
F-Value 9.82*** 7.61***
Division of labor. According to Witte, diﬀ erent promotors make diﬀ erent specialized 
contributions within the innovation process. To measure specialized contributions, we 
used 11 name generators to examine four diﬀ erent kinds of contributions within the 
innovation process. We distinguish between the exchange of knowledge, the exchange of 
meaningful opinions, the access to legitimate power, and the exchange of complementary 
help to achieve objectives. An example question for knowledge exchange was “With which 
persons, regardless of whether they work inside or outside COMPANY, are you discussing 
job-related questions, e.g., new product developments or new problem solutions?” (see 
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footnote 9 for all questions). Th e results in table 3 overall conﬁ rm Witte’s assumption. 
According to these ﬁ ndings the technological gatekeeper and the expert promoter more 
frequently take part in the exchange of knowledge, the relationship promoter more 
frequently takes part in the exchange of opinions, the power promoter more frequently 
opens the access to legitimate power, and the process promoter more frequently assists in 
complementary contributions to achieve objectives.
Table 3: Specialized contributions of the promotors*
Promoter Number of trans-
actions to exchange 
knowledge
Number of 
transactions to 
exchange mean-
ingful opinions 
Number of 
transactions to 
access legiti-
mate power 
Number of trans-
actions to exchange 
complementary 
help to achieve 
objectives 
Technolog. Gatekeeper (N = 94) 1.16 .22 .11 .21
Other Promoter (N = 351) .87 .21 .44 .28
F-Value 4.18** .03 17.50*** 1.15
Expert promoter (N = 150) 1.18 .28 .25 .22
Other Promoter (N = 295) .81 .18 .43 .29
F-Value 9.19*** 3.38** 6.26** 1.66
Relationship Promoter (N = 60) .85 .34 .40 .33
Other Promoter (N = 385) .94 .22 .36 .26
F-Value .31 5.09** .14 .83
Power promoter (N = 73) .53 .16 .85 .26
Other Promoter (N = 372) 1.01 .23 .27 .27
F-Value 9.45*** .83 45.77*** .02
Process promoter (N = 68) .58 .07 .44 .41
Other Promoter (N = 377) 1.00 .24 .36 .24
F-Value 6.82** 5.91** .87 4.85**
* N = 445, shaded fields symbolize high cooperation contributions of each promoter
9 Abbreviated version: 
(1) exchange of knowledge: (a) assistance by tricky and specialized development tasks, for which only little docu-
mented knowledge is available, (b) co-operation in the initial stage of projects, e.g., by the search of ideas, (c) 
knowledge exchange on job-related technical questions, e.g., on new developments or new solutions, (d) close 
technical collaboration; 
(2)  exchange of meaningful opinions : (a) discussion and evaluation of important job-related decisions, (b) confi-
dential discussion of business and/or private matters; 
(3)  access to legitimate power: (a) most important contacts for further vocational success, (b) acceptance as a di-
rect superior, (c) most important contacts for past vocational career; 
(4)  exchange of complementary help to achieve objectives: (a) cooperation in the implementation stage of projects, 
e.g., transferring results into other operational departments, (b) cooperation in the final stage of project, e.g., 
project management. The name generators are based on the research of Hansen (1999) und Burt (1992).
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Table 4 compares the contributions of promotors and champions. Th e results conﬁ rm that 
champions perform universal roles. In contrast to promotors, champions play multiple 
roles, and therefore make diverse, and consequently more, contributions: Th e more work 
roles a champion owns, the more often he is part of exchanges. Th e exceptional contribu-
tions of champions could be an additional explanation why the Anglo-American studies 
mainly ﬁ nd proof for the champion concept. Champions are easier observed by third 
parties than are the specialized promotors. 
Table 4:  Contributions of promotors compared to contributions of champions 
Promoter/Champion Number of transac-
tions to exchange 
knowledge
Number of transac-
tions to exchange 
meaningful 
opinions 
Number of trans-
actions to access 
legitimate power 
Number of transac-
tions to exchange 
complementary help 
to achieve objectives 
Promoter (N = 445) .93 .22 .37 .27
Champion with 2 roles (N = 168) 1.38 .32 .64 .50
Champion with 3 roles (N = 85) 2.15 .44 .85 .72
Champion with 4 roles (N = 73) 2.04 .53 .93 .79
Champion with 5 roles (N = 42) 2.45 .69 1.29 1.00
F-Value 31.43*** 10.07*** 19.34*** 23.32***
Proportion of promotors in networks. We created an overall index to test how promotors 
respectively champions inﬂ uence economic progress. Th is index measures the percentage 
of promotors in the network of one respondent, compared to all role owners (promotors 
plus champions). We assigned the value of one to all Alteri which take a promoter role 
and a value of zero to all Alteri that take a champion role. Afterwards, we calculated an 
overall index for each ego network. Th e maximum value of one indicates that a respondent 
has only promotors within the ego network. Th e minimum value of zero indicates that a 
respondent has only champions within the ego network.
Former technological knowledge. We measured the amount of former organizational knowl-
edge within a technology area and extent of uncertainty within this technology area via the 
following questions, using a Likert scale. “Fast growing amount of technological knowledge 
within the technology area” (value of one) or rather “few documented technological knowl-
edge within the technology area” (value of seven). “Specialized technological improvements 
within the technology area” (value of one) or rather “uncertain technological changes within 
the technology area” (value of seven). We calculated an overall index. Higher values indicate 
less available and less certain knowledge within the technological area10.
10 For measurement, see Winter (1987), Hansen (1999), Turner and Makhija (2006). High values indicate a vague 
optimization of the offering by the inventors. The parties share little common information on how knowledge 
should be produced (uncertainty with fast technological change) and overall few common skills, as only little 
documented knowledge is available (available amount of technological knowledge). 
sbr_october_inlet.indd   353 25.09.2007   16:42:48 Uhr
K. ROST/K. HÖLZLE/H.-G. GEMÜNDEN
  
  
  
         
 354 SBR 59  October 2007  340-363
5.3. MEASUREMENT OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
We used measures of the respondent’s past knowledge creation, since a scarce amount of 
new knowledge with a high assessed market value can only be measured retroactively. Our 
knowledge measurements are widely accepted: patents reﬂ ect the criteria of novelty, inven-
tive activity, and commercial applicability. We looked only at patents that were announced 
by the respondent’s institution. We do not consider private registrations or patent appli-
cations for other institutions. We measured new knowledge directly by previous revenues 
from patents and indirectly over the number of patents and the technological impact of 
these patents. Th e novelty of the underlying technology reﬂ ects a long-time measure-
ment. Radical innovation is often based on new technologies that will meet the demand 
years later11.
Number of patents. Th e number of patents measures the quantity of new, commercially 
applicable knowledge of an R&D-employee that is based on an inventive activity. Th is 
indicator does not assign a value to the speciﬁ c quality of knowledge. 
Economic impact of patents. We asked what the average annual amount of inventor remu-
neration was that an R&D employee received from his company in the last two years 
(rating scale: one = none, six = more than €10,000 per year). Th e inventor remunera-
tion is prescribed by the German legislation. Th e inventor must be given a percentage of 
the corporate proﬁ ts from his patents. If small turnovers are realized, then the inventor 
receives a ﬁ xed inventor’s bonus. If there is high turnover, the inventor receives a turn-
over-related remuneration12.
Technological impact of patents. We used external patent data to measure the technological 
novelty of patents. We calculated the number of directly received citations on company 
patents (EPi) of an inventor i. Th is index indicates in what respect the underlying tech-
nologies of patents were signiﬁ cant for other developments. Patent citations are based on 
the statements of an independent examiner. We limited the period of the citations per 
patent EPi to four years after publication, since older patents are cited with a higher prob-
ability. To compare inventors with diﬀ erent work experiences, we calculated the average 
annual number of citations for each inventor. We divided the number of patents by the 
years of work experience Ti′13. 
11 The use of patents in the industrial economics is documented by Scherer (1982), Griliches (1990), Harhoff and 
Reitzig (2001). We checked via publicly available information on the patent date which patents of a respondent 
were applied by his employer. The difference between technology and market aspects of new knowledge is dis-
cussed in detail by e.g., Danneels and Kleinschmidt (2001).
12 A fixed inventor’s bonus denotes the requirement on appropriate remuneration if the company uses the inven-
tion only to a small extent. The payment is effected after disclosure and amounts to max. 500,- EUR for single 
inventors (see § 2,4,5,6,9,10 of ArEG). Turnover-related remunerations are based on a considerable use of the 
invention by the enterprise. It is calculated based on the annual sales multiplied by the royalty rate multiplied by 
a portion factor (see § 2,4,5,6,9,10 of ArbEG).
13 We only considered direct citations. For a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of considering indirect 
citations see von Wartburg et al. (2005). We exclude non-European patents because of they could not be com-
pared. 
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 ∑ 
t′=t
 
t+3
 citipt′*  [  ∑ ep=1EPiT  ____ T i ′ ] 
A disadvantage of our research design is that the dependent variables for knowledge are 
based on previous success, but the independent variables, i.e., the proportion of promo-
tors/champions in ego networks, were asked at a later time. In regression analyses, only 
those actors may eﬀ ect knowledge generation who were employed in the company at the 
time, whereas the knowledge was invented. Th is assumption is realistic for our sample: 
the respondents know 86% of all named contacts longer than ﬁ ve years and 53% even 
longer than ten years.
5.4 MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
We controlled for the following personal characteristics of the respondent: Years of work 
experience within the current technology area,14 years of miscellaneous work experience, 
leading position in the company ( zero = “none/ little co-worker responsibility”, one = 
“medium/ large co-worker responsibility”), technological specialization (overall index of 
the items: one = “expert in one technological area,” seven = “expert in various technolog-
ical areas”; one = “technical and/or procedure specialist,” seven = “all-rounder in various 
technologies/ procedures”), self-practice of a promoter/champion role (15 items to the ﬁ ve 
normative role types, in each case three items per role type; one = respondent exercises 
at least one work role; zero = respondent exercises no work role), and portion of single 
inventions (measured by external patent data, index reaches maximally the value one if all 
patents represent single inventions15). 
We also controlled for the following aspects of the work environment: Th e number of 
informal role owners in the network of the respondent, the number of the remaining 
network contacts (based on the name generators of all job-related contacts, i.e., other 
persons who contribute to the innovation process). Table 5 shows the statistics of the vari-
ables. 
14 85% of all respondents have a university degree. Consequently, it is not necessary to control for this variable.
15 The index shows for the last 10 years how many additional inventors N contributed to the patent EPi of the in-
ventor i. If several persons contributåed to a patent, it is not fully attributed to the inventor i but rather the re-
ciprocal value of the total number of partners N. Finally, we calculated an average index for all patents of an in-
ventor i.
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Table 5:   Descriptive statistics of the indexes (N = 136)
Variables Min. Max.  Mean Std.dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Number of patents 1.00 136.00 18.66 23.79 2.70 9.05
Economic impact of patents 1.00 6.00 3.51 1.44 1.27 .93
Technological impact of patents .00 79.00 12.54 18.12 1.86 2.96
% of promotors in networks .00 1.00 .47 .28 –.21 –.86
Former technological knowledge 1.00 6.50 3.81 1.39 .31 –.63
Technological work experience 1.00 38.00 11.46 9.00 1.15 .46
Miscellaneous work experience 0.00 36.00 9.83 8.36 .75 .02
Leading position .00 1.00 .39 .49 .46 –1.81
Technological specialization .50 13.00 4.43 2.95 1.09 .92
Self-practice of a promoter/champion role .00 1.00 .40 .49 .40 –1.85
Portion of single inventions .33 1.00 .75 .25 –.27 –1.59
Network size of promoter/champions 1.00 23.00 7.11 4.41 1.41 1.93
Network size minus promoter/champions 1.00 22.00 8.51 4.37 .74 .53
5.5 METHOD OF ANALYSIS
We analyzed the pros and cons of promotors compared to champions by the interac-
tion between the previous technological knowledge and the proportion of promotors in 
networks on knowledge generation. Without this interaction, the amount of specializa-
tion in networks, i.e., the proportion of promotors in networks should have only weak 
eﬀ ects on knowledge generation. Considering the interaction between previous knowl-
edge and the amount of specialization, we expected to ﬁ nd signiﬁ cant and opposite eﬀ ects. 
We looked for a positive main eﬀ ect of the proportion of promotors in networks and a 
negative interaction eﬀ ect of the proportion of promotors in the network, simultaneously 
considering the amount of previous knowledge. Th e proportion of promotors should 
positively aﬀ ect the generation of knowledge. However, this eﬀ ect presupposes that much 
previous knowledge is available within a technological area. If there is a lower degree of 
previous knowledge within a technological area, then we expect that a high proportion of 
promotors hinder the knowledge generation of an employee.
We predict the dependent variable inventor remuneration using an OLS test. Th e 
dependent variable patent output represents an uncensored count variable, as all inven-
tors own at the least one patent. To predict the patent output we used a Poisson regres-
sion. For the dependent variable patent impact we observe a truncated distribution: 
approximately 40% of the inventors are involved in patents which are never cited. 
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Th e remaining inventors receive an average of 21 citations per patent. Th us, the vari-
able patent impact represents a censored variable and can be predicted by using a Tobit 
regression (maximum likelihood estimation). We conﬁ rmed the results of the Tobit 
regression by means of an alternative estimation procedure, the negative binomial regres-
sion (Fleming and Sorenson (2004)).
6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We conduct a step-wise analysis. In a ﬁ rst step, we enter all variables without the interac-
tion terms (model 1 in table 6) and in our second step, all variables considering the inter-
action terms (model 2 in table 6). Th e results in model 1 indicate that the proportion of 
promotors only slightly inﬂ uences the knowledge generation of a respondent. Th e propor-
tion of promotors is signiﬁ cantly and positively related to the number of patents. Th us, 
the number of specialized promotors seems to support the number of inventions more 
than do the number of generalized champions. 
Th e ﬁ ndings in model 2 that consider the interaction terms demonstrate that the propor-
tion of promotors is signiﬁ cantly and positively related to the knowledge generation of 
the respondent. Th ese eﬀ ects are signiﬁ cant in all models except for the negative bino-
mial regression. Th e regression coeﬃ  cients of the proportion of promotors are 0.34 for 
the number of patents (p < 0.001), 20.1 for the technological impact of patents (p < 
0.05), and 10.78 for the economic impact of patents (p < 0.001). In addition, the data 
supports the fact that in the case of less and uncertain previous knowledge, a high propor-
tion of promotors prevents the knowledge generation. We ﬁ nd several robust moderation 
eﬀ ects, that is, previous knowledge consistently alters the usefulness of promotors. Th e 
regression coeﬃ  cients of the interaction between the amount of previous knowledge and 
the proportion of promotors are –0.81 for the number of patents (p < 0.001), –27.05 
(p < 0.001) and –0.68 (p < 0.1) for the technological impact of patents, and –2.41 
for the economic impact of patents (p < 0.001). Overall, our ﬁ ndings conﬁ rm the idea 
that for incremental innovation, promotors are better suited to fostering the economic 
progress within organizations, but for radical innovation, champions are better suited to 
fostering the economic progress within organizations.
Our results also show that the knowledge generation is higher in technological areas where 
there is little previous knowledge. We do not consider the alternating algebraic signs of the 
control variables. Th e causes are explained in more detail by Rost (Rost (2006)).
7 DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS
Our empirical results conﬁ rm the assumption that both promotors and champions are a 
fundamental part of organizations. Both promotors and champions support the knowl-
edge generation of other employees by promoting innovations through the crucial organ-
izational stages. Whether promotors or champions are better or worse is determined by 
the amount of the previous knowledge in the industry. If organizations only reﬁ ne and 
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improve an existing design, then promotors are more qualiﬁ ed. In advanced technologies, 
specialized employees with deep basic knowledge, i.e., component knowledge, recognize 
opportunities better than do generalized employees with broad marginal knowledge, i.e., 
architectural knowledge. Th is is the reason why champions are less suited to reduce the 
barriers against incremental innovation. If economic progress cannot build on previous 
knowledge and organizations introduce a new concept that diﬀ ers in a signiﬁ cant way 
from past practice, then champions are more capable. Champions possess a high amount 
of architectural or general knowledge and are therefore better positioned to reduce the 
barriers against radical innovation, i.e., to reduce the decision-making problems between 
the diverse parties.
In summary, the champion approach and the promoter approach are part of the same 
phenomenon: both work roles actively and enthusiastically promote innovations. Th e 
advantages of one over the other depend on the character of economic progress within an 
industry. Anglo-American studies apparently focus more on radical innovation and there-
fore observe the successful “great man”, i.e., the champion. German-speaking studies 
based on Witte focus more on incremental innovation and favour the division of labour, 
i.e., promotors. 
Finally, we ask what organizations can learn from informal work roles. Practitioners often 
ignore informal work roles as they appear irrelevant to managerial practice. Traditional 
command-and-control systems seem to ensure rule-following and apparently regulate 
employees’ performance well enough. So far, only researchers discuss how to search for, 
ﬁ nd, and foster promotors or champions. Nevertheless promotors, champions, and other 
voluntary behaviors occur in organizations, and research consistently conﬁ rms that espe-
cially informal organizational structures support innovations. Th e fact that command-
and-control systems are not very eﬀ ective for innovating is hardly surprising; given that 
research on promotors and champions shows that these helping behaviors are typically 
volunteered. Th e question of how the existing organizational structure can enhance inno-
vation is unclear. In principle, it is not the job of promotors and champions to overcome 
barriers of other employees. However, it is obvious that managers fulﬁ l this task only 
suboptimally (e.g. Hauschildt (2004)). Nevertheless, it is not enough to highlight the 
advantages of informal structures and the disadvantages of formal structures. Researchers 
must also show alternative command-and-control systems that optimally support innova-
tions. Th e search for alternative command-and-control systems calls for further research. 
It seems that organizations are between the devil and the deep blue sea: tough informal 
structures foster innovations, but they are not a systematic part of the command-and-
control system. Tough formal structures steer the organization, but they undoubtedly 
prevent innovations. 
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